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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 24, 2003, in the presence of the then Australian Prime 
Minster John Howard and Chinese President Hu Jintao, the two 
governments signed an Australia-China Trade and Economic Framework, 
announcing an agenda for a closer bilateral relationship in the coming 
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years.1  In response, this was followed by a joint study to explore the 
feasibility of an Australia-China Free Trade Agreement (“ACFTA”).2  Prior 
to the accomplishment of the Joint Feasibility Study in March 2005, China 
asked for Australia’s acknowledgment of its large contribution to an 
improved market economy as a precondition for the commencement of the 
ACFTA negotiation.3  Notwithstanding numerous controversial submissions 
made by domestic manufacturers, the Australian government, attracted by 
China’s huge market potential, granted China full market economy status in 
order to embark on the ACFTA negotiation.4  As of the end of January 
2009, when this Paper was being written, thirteen negotiating rounds have 
been concluded and a final agreement has not yet been reached.5  Moreover, 
the successful conclusion of free trade agreements (“FTAs”) between China 
and some of Australia’s neighboring countries, such as New Zealand and 
Singapore, has rendered it possible that Australia will lose more bargaining 
power and gain less opportunities during the ACFTA negotiation.  The 
progress achieved so far in the negotiation is disappointing due to a lack of 
consensus between the two parties over certain key aspects (for example, 
government procurement, agricultural products, intellectual property rights, 
services and investment).6  However, notwithstanding any conflicts of 
diverse interests, the fundamental issue arising “behind the curtain” is how 
both parties can construct better strategies to keep a balance between 
creating more open access in the other party’s market and protecting 
domestic industries in a weak position from the injurious “flood” of the 
other party’s imports.  Over the past decades, trade remedies adopted in 
FTAs have been defended as a “safety valve” and thus become the most 
effective and common means employed by negotiating parties to address 
this critical issue.  
Current rules under the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) contain 
regulatory regimes for three major trade remedy measures: anti-dumping 
 1. See generally Australia-China Trade and Economic Framework, (Oct. 24, 2003), 
http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=6894&lang=en. 
 2. See  THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, AUSTRALIA AND THE 
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, CHINA, AUSTALIA — CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: JOINT 
FEASIBILITY STUDY (2005), http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/feasibility_full.pdf 
[hereinafter FEASIBILITY STUDY].  
 3. See Mendaka Abeysekera, Australia Grants Full Market Economy Status to 
China, ASIAN TRIB., Apr. 20, 2005, http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2005/04/20/australia-
grants-full-market-economy-status-china. 
 4. Id. 
 5. For all updated news and official documents of Australia-China Free Trade 
Agreement negotiations, please visit Australian Government: Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, Australia-China Free Trade Agreement Negotiations, http://www.dfat.gov.au/ 
geo/china/fta/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Australia-China FTA]. 
 6. Australian Government Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Subscriber Update: 
Thirteenth Round of Negotiations, Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/ 
china/fta/081217_subscriber_update.html.
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measures, countervailing measures, and safeguard actions taken.  The 
primary purpose of these measures is to allow member states to temporarily 
suspend the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) and WTO 
tariff binding obligations under certain circumstances by restricting imports 
through the trade remedy measures.  In bilateral free trade agreements, trade 
remedies are widely employed.  Two main factors account for this trend.  
One factor is that domestic industries will always be at greater risk because 
parties’ obligations in bilateral free trade agreements often go well beyond 
those found in multilateral agreements.  The second factor is that 
governments tend to take these measures as a last resort to quell domestic 
protectionist pressure, and FTAs frequently negotiated by administrative 
agencies are thus more readily passed and approved by the legislature when 
they are debated.   
Both Australia and China have identified the negotiation of bilateral 
trade agreements as their trade policy priorities in recent years.  Strikingly, 
as of February 2009, Australia already has bilateral agreements with 
Thailand, Chile, the United States, and Singapore; a closer economic 
relations pact with New Zealand; and a recent agreement signed with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) and New Zealand to 
establish a free trade area.7  In addition, FTA negotiations with China, 
Japan, and some other countries are also underway.8  In a similar vein, as of 
February 2009, China has formed numerous bilateral FTAs, including with 
Pakistan, Chile, ASEAN, New Zealand, and Singapore, and China is 
currently negotiating with South Korea and South Africa.  Mainland China 
is also a member of two closer economic partnership arrangements with 
Hong Kong and Macao.  It should be noted that there are specific provisions 
that tenuously cover trade remedies under all aforementioned agreements 
that Australia and China have already signed.  These provisions in FTAs 
represent different approaches to trade remedies, yet share similarities, 
notwithstanding the diversity of trade and economic situations in those 
various countries and regions. 
The primary purpose of this Paper is to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of trade remedy provisions in FTAs.  It will focus on FTAs that 
Australia and China have already formed with other trading partners 
respectively.  This focus is adopted because this Paper also aims at offering 
some practical suggestions on trade remedy measures for the proposed 
ACFTA.  Part II will begin by discussing the legal basis of trade remedies in 
FTAs relating to regulations embedded in WTO agreements.  This will be 
 7. For official documents of Australia’s bilateral agreements with these partners, 
see Australian Governmen: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Free Trade 
Agreements,  http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/ftas.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2009). 
 8. There are several FTA negotiations undertaken by Australia, including China, 
Japan, Gulf Cooperation Council, Korea, and Malaysia.  Australia is also participating in 
negotiating for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.  See generally id.
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followed by an examination of some relevant documents in the current 
ACFTA negotiation.  Part III will discuss trade remedies in the proposed 
ACFTA by addressing trade remedy provisions that both Australia and 
China have already signed with other partners.  On this basis, the remainder  
of Part III will provide some suggestions as to how Australia and China 
should design and develop trade remedies in the ACFTA.  This Paper will 
conclude by highlighting the importance of laying down trade remedy 
provisions in the forthcoming ACFTA.  The trade remedy provisions are 
paramount, as they will have been one of the impetuses for the successful 
conclusion of the negotiation, a better bilateral FTA, and an effective 
implementation of the future agreement; thereby, strengthening the closer 
trade and economic partnership between the two countries in the coming 
years. 
II. THE RATIONAL BASIS FOR TRADE REMEDIES UNDER THE REGIONAL 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A. Free Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO Framework 
A free trade agreement is a negotiated agreement between two or more 
countries or territories to form a free trade area through which more 
favorable conditions on trade are granted to participating counties or 
territories in the area.9  It is said that FTAs depart from the most-favoured-
treatment obligation of GATT/WTO members, which is the cornerstone of 
the post-war GATT/WTO world trading system.  Notwithstanding this risk, 
there are, however, several clauses that tenuously address various FTAs in 
the GATT/WTO framework. 
Paragraphs 4–10 of Article XXIV of the GATT, and its relevant official 
interpretation, the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of 
the GATT 1994, regulate the formation and operation of a customs union 
and a free trade area in goods.10  Moreover, they specifically identify the 
conditions of establishing and entering into regional trade agreements in the 
form of a customs union and a free trade area.11
Paragraph 2(c) of the Decision of November 28, 1979 on Differential 
and More Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
 9. There are numerous books regarding the topic of free trade agreement or regional 
trade agreement.  See, e.g., REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM
(Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006). 
 10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; see also World Trade Organization, Understanding 
on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/10-24.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2009). 
 11. Id.
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Developing Countries, otherwise called the Enabling Clause,12 empowers 
certain countries to engage in preferential trade arrangements in goods trade 
if all parties involved are developing countries. 
In addition, a similar set of conditions to Article XXIV of the GATT, 
that have to be met by regional agreements for both developed and 
developing countries, is also addressed in Article V of General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (“GATS”).13
B. Trade Remedies Under the GATT/WTO 
Generally, trade remedy measures that are permitted in the GATT/WTO 
framework mainly cover three basic types: anti-dumping measures, 
countervailing measures, and safeguard measures.  These specific measures 
enable WTO members to temporarily depart from the obligations that they 
committed to during tariff negotiations under the GATT/WTO in seeking 
short-term relief for domestic stakeholders.  By undertaking these measures, 
the interests of numerous domestic stakeholders, when faced with the 
increasingly severe challenges relating to overseas competition arising out 
of FTAs, are thus taken into account and balanced.   
Anti-dumping measures and countervailing measures have been designed 
and taken to combat purported “unfair trade” practices.  If imports from a 
certain country or territory are sold at dumped prices in a domestic market 
and cause injurious dumping to domestic industries, anti-dumping measures 
can be invoked to control this distorted competition.  Similarly, 
countervailing measures are undertaken to fight against unfair subsidies 
obtained from foreign governments for exports to lower prices and domestic 
industries are thus subject to the intolerable competition of their foreign 
rivals.  In light of this, Article VI of the GATT 14and the 1994 Anti-
dumping Agreement (“1994 ADA”)15 are basic anti-dumping regulations in 
the GATT/WTO, while Article VI of the GATT, Article XVI of the GATT16
and the 1994 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“1994 
SCM”)17 primarily address the issue of subsidies and countervailing.  
 12. Report of the panel, Differential and More Favorable Treatment Reciprocity and 
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, ¶2(c), L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling_e.pdf. 
 13. General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. V, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
183 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994). 
 14. GATT, supra note 10, art. VI. 
 15. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ADA]. 
 16. GATT, supra note 10, art. XVI. 
 17. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14  (1994) 
[hereinafter 1994 SCM]. 
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In addition, WTO rules also provide a remedy which the “flood” of 
imports into the domestic market causes or threatens to cause serious 
injuries to the specific domestic industry.  As a result, safeguard measures, 
through the means of quotas and other trade restriction measures, can be 
temporarily undertaken to deal with the issue.  Under safeguard rules 
currently operating in the WTO, i.e. Article XIX of the GATT18 and its 
annex via the Agreement on Safeguards,19 safeguard measures should be 
applied to imports “irrespective of their source.”20
C. Trade Remedies Under the Free Trade Agreement 
According to the WTO, as of December 2008, 421 regional trade 
agreements (“RTAs”) have been notified to the WTO.21  Furthermore, there 
are indications that almost 400 RTAs are scheduled to be implemented by 
2010.22  Among them, FTAs and partial scope agreements account for over 
90%, while customs unions make up less than 10%.23  On the face of it, 
these statistics suggest the current wave of regionalism.  However, one 
concern regarding this wave is whether the growth of regionalism results in 
the interests of certain domestic stakeholders being hurt.  A further concern 
is what strategies can be developed to ensure minimal injuries to domestic 
industries when RTAs are implemented.  Consequently, trade remedy 
measures, as an effective and efficient means to respond to these challenges, 
have been adopted in most RTAs, notably FTAs. 
Generally, a number of methods can be adopted to regulate trade 
remedies under a free trade agreement.  For example, in some FTAs, 
member states are obliged to grant exemptions from taking anti-dumping 
measures and countervailing measures against the products from other 
members engaged in the agreement.  One such an attempt can be found in 
the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 
(“ANZCERTA”).24  Another method is undertaking special anti-dumping or 
anti-subsidy investigations against member states via a set of unique 
substantive and procedural rules.  Possible ways to do this may include 
establishing a special organization or body amongst member states to deal 
 18. GATT, supra note 10, art. 19. 
 19. Agreement on Safeguards and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 154 (1994) [hereinafter Safeguards].  
 20. Id. art. 2, ¶ 2.2. 
 21. WTO, Regional Trade Agreements Gateway, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e 
/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2009). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Protocol to the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations — Trade 
Agreement on Acceleration of Free Trade in Goods, Austl.-N.Z., art. 4, Aug. 18, 1988, 1988 
Austl. T.S. No. 18 (requiring parties to abolish anti-dumping actions after July 1990 when 
free trade was achieved). 
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with the disputes arising out of anti-dumping or countervailing 
investigations.  The North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) is 
the best example to illustrate this method.25
Compared with anti-dumping measures and countervailing measures, 
safeguard measures in FTAs are more complex.  Three basic types of 
safeguard measures are usually addressed in most FTAs, including bilateral 
safeguards, special safeguards, and global safeguards. 
Bilateral safeguards are often implemented during the transition period, a 
period that provides both parties of the agreement certain time to remove or 
reduce the tariffs as they committed to in the agreement.  In most cases, 
bilateral safeguards allow the suspension of the tariff reduction or an 
increase in the tariff from the preferential rate to the previous Most- 
Favoured-Nation (MFN) level.  These measures are legally permitted during 
the transition period and are thus often able to be implemented within two 
or three years.  However, once the transition period finishes, bilateral 
safeguards have to be stifled. 
Special safeguards have been designed and taken to protect sensitive 
sectors for parties engaged in FTAs.  Sensitive sectors referred to, in this 
context, are industrial sectors that manufacture products which are crucial to 
countries or territories.  By invoking special safeguards, parties in FTAs are 
thus able to avoid the protection pressure brought to bear by various 
domestic stakeholders.   
According to the Agreement on Safeguards, WTO members should be 
treated equally when global safeguards are undertaken.26  However, some 
FTAs agree to exclude imports of parties in FTAs from global safeguard 
actions.  This approach does raise a query as to whether it violates the non-
discrimination principle of the GATT/WTO.27  Although WTO panels 
applied the rule of “parallelism” to deal with global safeguard disputes in 
FTAs, which prohibits an asymmetry between the safeguard investigation 
and the application of its resulting safeguard measure,28 they avoided 
evaluating the aforementioned approach in the context of the GATT/WTO 
framework.  Nonetheless, notwithstanding the absence of a definitive 
conclusion, WTO members continue to adopt this approach when taking 
global safeguard measures in their respective FTAs. 
 25. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 19, Dec. 17, 
1992, 32. I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
 26. Safeguards, supra note 19, art. 2, ¶ 2.2. 
 27. The non-discrimination principle is one of the cornerstones of the GATT/WTO 
system, and an obligation for all WTO members, which requires that all traders and all goods 
are treated in a fair and equal manner. 
 28. For details, see Robert Teh et el., Trade Remedy Provisions in Regional Trade 
Agreement 25–26 (WTO Econ. Research & Statistics Div., Staff Working Paper ERSD-
2007-03, 2007). 
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D. Trade Remedies Under the Feasibility Study of the SINO-
Australia Free Trade Agreement 
1. Trade Remedies Under the Feasibility Study: Facts and 
Concerns 
The joint feasibility study of ACFTA was accomplished in March 2005 
after a summit meeting between Australia and China.  According to the 
official documents distributed during the past years,29 the two countries 
have set up working groups and discussed the trade remedy issue in several 
rounds of the negotiation that have been held so far.30
Given the dearth of information that has been released regarding the 
details of negotiation rounds, the joint feasibility study provides a rough 
roadmap to explore the issue of trade remedies in the ACFTA. 
Section 6 of the joint feasibility study, which is titled “Implications for 
Bilateral Cooperation,” outlines the possible areas for enhanced bilateral 
cooperation between the two countries through the FTA.31  Sub-Section 
6.10 specifically addresses trade remedies of both countries’ policies and 
programs, including anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and 
safeguard measures.32
In light of Sub-Section 6.10, Australia subjects injurious dumping 
practices to anti-dumping investigations in accordance with its obligations 
under Article VI of the GATT and the WTO 1994 ADA.33  Ways to do this 
include examining the three criteria of an anti-dumping investigation which 
are embedded in the 1994 ADA, i. e., alleged dumping, alleged injury, and 
their causal link; and setting the sunset clause for the termination of anti-
dumping measures.34  Prior to 2004, Australia regarded China as an 
“economy in transition,”35 which empowered the Australian anti-dumping 
authority to examine whether the Chinese government is involved in price-
setting activities operated by Chinese exporters.  This also rendered it 
possible for Australia to adopt a surrogate approach to determine the 
dumping margin in anti-dumping investigations if establishing the fact that 
the government influenced the price of the product.  Between 1995 and 
2004, according to the feasibility study, a total of eighteen anti-dumping 
investigations into Chinese products were initiated by Australia.36  Among 
them, six cases were finally brought to impose anti-dumping duties.37  This 
 29. See generally Australia–China FTA, supra note 5. 
 30. Id. 
 31. FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 2, at 86–116. 
 32. Id. at 111–15. 
 33. Id. at 111. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 112. 
 36. Id. 
 37. FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 2, at 112.
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apparently contrasts with anti-dumping initiations and imposition by China 
against Australian products in the same period, which accounted for zero of 
a total of thirty-three anti-dumping investigations it reported since 1997.38
The basic anti-dumping regime in China is addressed in China’s Foreign 
Trade Law39 and the Anti-dumping Regulation.40  The Ministry of 
Commerce (“MOFCOM”), China’s official anti-dumping administering 
authority, also promulgated some detailed regulations to administer anti-
dumping affairs. 
Domestic regulations regarding countervailing measures in both 
Australia and China are currently subject to Article VI of the GATT, Article 
XVI of the GATT, and the 1994 SCM.  Australia’s key legislation for 
undertaking countervailing measures includes its Customs Act 190141 and 
The Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act 1975,42 while China’s main 
framework is embedded in Article 43 of its Foreign Trade Law43 and the 
Anti-Subsidy Regulation.44  The Australian Customs Service and China’s 
MOFCOM are designated authorities in the two countries that are 
respectively responsible for anti-subsidy investigations.  Unlike anti-
dumping measures, in light of the feasibility study which was accomplished 
in 2005 and other subsequent documents, Australia had never initiated any 
anti-subsidy investigations targeted at Chinese products until March 2008.45
This approach is also adopted by China as it has abstained from undertaking 
countervailing measures against Australian exporters.  However, the latest 
developments in Australia are indicating that this approach has been 
changed.  On March 26, 2008, Australia initiated an investigation into 
alleged anti-dumping and subsidization from China in respect of certain 
toilet paper.46  This became the first anti-subsidy investigation initiated by 
 38. Id. at 113 (stating that according to the joint “feasibility study,” China has not 
initiated any anti-dumping investigation on products originating in Australia).  
 39. See Seabay, Foreign Trade Law of The People’s Republic of China (1994), 
http://www.seabay.cn/freightknowledge/20050615/1968347.html. 
 40. See generally Regulations on Anti-Dumping (effective June 1, 2004) (P.R.C.) 
http://www.cacs.gov.cn/cacs/falv/falvshow.aspx?str1%20=3&articleId=38667. 
 41. Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act 1975, 1975, ¶ 6 (stating that the Customs 
Act of 1901 has been incorporated into the 1975 Act). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Seabay, supra note 39, art. 43. 
 44. See generally Regulations on Countervailing Measures (effective June 1, 2004) 
(P.R.C.) http://chinatradedata.com/resources/trade-laws-and-regualations/117-regulations-of-
the-peoples-republic-of-china-on-countervailing-measures. 
 45. The feasibility study said there had been no anti-subsidy investigation targeted at 
Chinese products until the date that the study was being written. See FEASIBILITY STUDY,
supra note 2, at 111–15. Since the study was released, it had been no anti-subsidy 
investigations initiated by Australia against Chinese products that were officially reported 
until March 26, 2008.  Id.
 46. Certain Toilet Paper Exported from The People’s Republic of China and The 
Republic of Indonesia: Initiation of An Investigation into Alleged Dumping and Subsidization 
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Australia against Chinese exports.  Although the two petitioners withdrew 
the countervailing duty notice in this case, Australia, in late December 
2008, began another investigation into anti-dumping and subsidization from 
China in respect of certain hollow structural sections.47  This decision was 
heavily criticized by China who contended that it is inconsistent with WTO 
rules.48
Although both Australia and China commit themselves to taking 
safeguard measures under Article XIX of the GATT and the WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards, Australia does lack specific domestic legislation 
to regulate the imposition of safeguard measures.  Compared with anti-
dumping measures and countervailing measures, the administering authority 
in Australia for safeguard investigations has been transferred to the 
Treasurer and the Productivity Commission if the Australian government 
agrees that the investigation is necessary.49  At the domestic level, Australia 
has initiated one safeguard inquiry since the establishment of the WTO in 
1995.50  However, this investigation did not result in a final safeguard 
measure being taken.  At the FTA level, under ANZCERTA and the 
Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement (“SAFTA”),51 imports from 
New Zealand and Singapore cannot be subject to safeguard measures 
undertaken by Australia against foreign exports.52
In contrast, Article 44 of the Foreign Trade Law53 and the Safeguard 
Measures Regulation54 form the foundation of China’s safeguard actions, 
which also empower MOFCOM to undertake safeguard investigations in 
China.  Since the enactment of China’s safeguards legislation, there has 
from China, and Alleged Dumping from Indonesia, Australia Customs Dumping Notice No. 
2008/12 (Mar. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Dumping Notice 1]. 
 47. Certain Hollow Structural Sections Exported from The People’s Republic of 
China and Malaysia: Initiation of An Investigation into Alleged Dumping and Subsidization,
Australian Customs Dumping Notice No. 2008/45, (Dec. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Dumping 
Notice 2]. 
 48. Xinhua News Agency, China Regrets, Opposes Australia’s Anti-Dumping 
Investigation on Weld Carbon Steel Pipe, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Dec. 26, 2008, 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90884/6562204.html. 
 49. FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 2, at 114. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Sing.-Austl., Feb. 17, 2003, 2003 
Austl. T.S. No. 16 [hereinafter SAFTA]. 
 52. See Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations — Trade Agreement, art. 
17, Jan. 1, 1989, 1988 No. 20.  Article 17 only regulated bilateral safeguards during the 
transition period.  Because the transition period was accomplished in 1988 which has 
rendered the abovementioned provisions regarding bilateral safeguards invalid.  Currently, 
no bilateral safeguards can thus be undertaken between Australia and New Zealand.  For 
details on safeguards in SAFTA, see supra note 51, art. 9. 
 53. See Seabay, supra note 39, art. 44. 
 54. See generally Regulations on Safeguard Measures (effective June 1, 2004) 
(P.R.C) www.cacs.gov.cn/cacs/falv/falvshow.aspx?str1=3&articleId=38669. 
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been only one safeguard investigation into foreign imports.55  The case was 
initiated in May 2002, and definitive safeguard measures were imposed.56
However, in December 2003, one year after their imposition, China 
announced the termination of these safeguard measures.57
In light of the joint feasibility study, some products may fall within the 
important sectors category.58  This renders it possible that discussions will 
be engaged in during the FTA negotiation between the two countries to 
determine whether bilateral safeguards can be applied to these sectors.  
These products identified in the joint feasibility study include cotton, dairy, 
horticulture, seafood, forest products, meat, barley, wool, wheat, sugar, 
rapeseed, textile and clothing, automotive industry, and chemicals and 
plastics.59
The joint feasibility study concluded by highlighting three main areas for 
consideration of further cooperation under the proposed FTA regarding 
trade remedies.  The three main areas are informal consultations as well as 
dialogue concerning the issue of trade remedies in the Doha round; 
technical exchange, particularly officials’ exchanges between administering 
authorities of trade remedies in the two countries; and promoting dialogue 
and cooperation between domestic industries in the two countries to resolve 
potential trade remedy cases.60
2. Trade Remedies Under the Feasibility Study: Some 
Observations 
The statistics of trade remedies provided by the feasibility study, as 
indicated above, may superficially suggest an asymmetry between Australia 
and China in regard to undertaking trade remedy measures.  Strikingly, the 
statistics provided by the feasibility study appear curious, as there has been 
a dramatic difference between the two countries when taking anti-dumping 
measures.  
To explain the issue, some background about the two countries in regard 
to anti-dumping measures is warranted.  During the past decades, the United 
States, the European Union (“EU”), Canada, and Australia have been the 
 55. See Li Heng, China Applies Safeguard Measures to Five Imported Steel 
Products, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Nov. 22, 2002, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200211
/21/eng20021121_107218.shtml. 
 56. Id.
 57. Trade and Industry Department, Commercial Information Circular No. 4/2004,
Termination of Final Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, Jan. 8, 
2004, http://www.tid.gov.hk/textonly/english/aboutus/tradecircular/cic/asia/2004/ci042004
.html.  
 58. FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 2, at 28–38. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 115. 
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major countries frequently taking anti-dumping measures worldwide.61
Despite being a frequent user of anti-dumping measures, Australia is clearly 
not as anxious as the others in this group, notably the United States and the 
EU.  As a result, unlike other members of the group, Australia tends to be 
relatively restrictive in its application of anti-dumping measures.  This 
policy adopted by Australia is more likely to correspond with its status in 
world trade.  According to statistics provided by the WTO, Australia was 
ranked twenty-third in the list of major exporters and twenty-first major 
importer of merchandise in world trade in 2008, which accounted for 1.17% 
of total world exports and 1.22% of total imports respectively.62  Such a fact 
suggests that although Australia attaches great importance to trade, the 
market presence it retains is not sufficiently large to render it a leading 
player in international trade.  Consequently, a balanced strategy with 
primary concern on free trade and relatively limited employment of 
protection means will better serve its national interests.  Although anti-
dumping investigations are started by individuals’ choices, this 
government’s policy choice may contribute to the development of 
Australia’s anti-dumping law and policy in practice to a certain extent, 
which further prevents frequent initiations of anti-dumping investigations 
because domestic industries are more likely to seek anti-dumping remedies 
if overseas imports are easy to prosecute. Apart from this policy tendency,
many other factors may also come into play in this process to reduce trade 
remedy disputes.  For example, more skillful lawyers have been employed 
by Chinese enterprises when they are subject to anti-dumping 
investigations.  Their increasing role in successfully representing and 
assisting clients in many anti-dumping cases has been widely recognized.63
As a result, it should be noted that, compared with numerous anti-dumping 
investigations initiated by the United States and the EU, anti-dumping 
investigations undertaken by Australia only form a small part of the whole 
picture regarding investigations worldwide into Chinese exports during the 
 61. ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE V (John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst  
eds., 1989). 
 62. World Trade Organization, Trade Profile of Australia, Oct. 2009, 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfiles/AU_e.htm [hereinafter Australia Profile].  For other 
related information, see also Xu M. & Huang R., Multilateral Trade Liberalization or 
Bilateral Trade Liberalization?: An Analysis of Australian Trade Liberalization Strategy, 3 
ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. REV. 44–47 (2007).  
 63. In recent years, Chinese enterprises have won many anti-dumping cases in 
Australia. One of the crucial factors is that more skilful lawyers are sought and hired to 
represent these enterprises. For example, the carpet gripper case which happened in 2001. 
See Ao da Li Ya Di Tan Ding Fan Qing Xiao An Zhong Guo Qi Ye Shen Su [Australia Carpet 
Gripper Anti-dumping Case: Chinese Enterprises Win], NEW EXPRESS, Mar. 16, 2002, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/b/20020316/181075.html; see also Australian Customs Dumping 
Notice, 2001/48 (July 23, 2001), available at http://www.customs.gov.au/site/ 
content2252.asp; see also Australian Customs Dumping Notice, 2002/09 (Feb. 19, 2002), 
available at http://www.customs.gov.au/site/content2336.asp. 
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past decades,64 even though Australia did not acknowledge China’s full 
market economy status until April 2005.65
On the contrary, according to the WTO Secretariat, every year China is 
the country subject to the most anti-dumping investigations since its 
accession to the WTO.66  Meanwhile, the number of anti-dumping 
investigations initiated by China that targeted foreign imports has also been 
steadily increasing in recent years.67  This implies that equipped with robust 
national anti-dumping legislation, China is attempting to shift from being a 
passive victim to an astute user of anti-dumping measures.  
Notwithstanding the above historical account, statistics of the feasibility 
study have highlighted that prior to 2005, Australia had undertaken several 
anti-dumping investigations against Chinese products.68  Moreover, between 
March 2005 and 2008, during the period of the ACFTA negotiation, a 
number of anti-dumping investigations were continuously initiated by 
Australia in regard to Chinese exports.69  However, as indicated above, it is 
surprising that, in contrast to Australia, so far no anti-dumping 
investigations have been initiated by China in regard to Australian products 
(not only prior to 2005 according to the feasibility study, but also between 
2005 and the present).70  This raises the question of why such a difference 
exists.  
To analyse this, a couple of factors should be taken into account.  One is 
the asymmetry in economic status between the two countries.  According to 
WTO statistics in 2009, China was placed second as the main destination 
and the main origin for Australia’s merchandise trade in 2008, accounting 
for 14.6% of the total value of Australia’s exports and 15.6% of the total 
value of Australia’s imports.71  Nonetheless, however, Australia was 
apparently not on the list of China’s main destinations and main countries of 
origin.72  Despite this, Australian entities are capable of supplying products 
that are in high demand by China for its economic reform and development.  
For example, WTO statistics also show that in 2008, fuels and mining 
 64. Relevant conclusion can be drawn from the WTO anti-dumping statistics 
provided by WTO members.  See Press Release, WTO, WTO Secretariat Reports Increase in 
New Anti-Dumping Investigations (May 7, 2009), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/ 
pres09_e/pr556_e.htm [hereinafter Press Release]. 
 65. Abeysekera, supra note 3 (stating that Australia did not regard China as a full 
market economy until April 2005). 
 66. Press Release, supra note 64. 
 67. Id. 
 68. FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 2. 
 69. See, e.g., Dumping Notice 1, supra note 46; Dumping Notice 2, supra note 47. 
 70. FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 2 (when this Paper was being written in January 
2009, there are also no reported anti-dumping cases initiated by China against Australia 
products between 2005 to the present). 
 71. See Australia Profile, supra note 62. 
 72. See World Trade Organization, Trade Profile of China (Oct. 2009), 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfiles/CN_e.htm [hereinafter China Profile]. 
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products accounted for 27.1% of China’s total imports,73 while Australian 
fuels and mining products accounted for 59.7% for its total exports.74
Apparently, Australian entities have obtained a competitive advantage in 
regard to these products and they exclusively retain certain market presence 
worldwide.  More importantly, this is particularly true in the cases of 
mining products and natural gas, which are essential to China’s 
development in the coming years.75  Currently, in respect to these products, 
China’s domestic industries and other foreign producers are still incapable 
of effectively and efficiently competing with Australian industries.  
Australia, in this regard, is playing a paramount role in supplying the raw 
material for China’s economic development.  Strikingly, this contrasts with 
other trade patterns that most developed countries employ in China or in 
other developing countries, as they are essentially not suppliers, but 
recipients, of the resource.76
Conversely, products such as textiles, chemicals, food, and fruit are the 
main Chinese exports to Australia.77  Most of these products are 
manufactured goods, and thus readily draw attention from competitive 
domestic producers.  Consequently, Chinese products in the Australian 
market are relatively easier to prosecute and are subject to anti-dumping 
measures, compared with Australian products in the Chinese market, with 
raw materials and services being the most popular exports that meet the 
needs for China’s economic development.78  On the other hand, Australian 
domestic industries do not have comparative advantages to compete with 
foreign exports in regard to many commodities in which Chinese exports 
play a predominant role in the global market.79  This fact may explain the 
question as to why Australia, among the group of frequent trade remedy 
users (notably the EU and the United States), still has fewer anti-dumping 
investigations against Chinese products in certain areas.  The 
abovementioned analysis relating to anti-dumping measures employed by 
the two countries also strongly supports the argument that these two 
economies are mutually complementary.80  Moreover, this further implies 
that the potential to fully implement the existing comparative advantage of 
each country in the other’s market may contribute to both countries’ 
engagement in this free trade negotiation. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Australia Profile, supra note 62. 
 75. China Profile, supra note 72. 
 76. Zong-Xian Feng & Lu-Yao Yu, Fei Dui Chen De Zhong Guo Ao Da Li Ya Fan 
Qing Xiao Ge Ju He Zhong Guo Shi Chang Jing Ji Tan Pan Di Wei [The Asymmetric Sino-
Australia Anti-Dumping Pattern and Negotiation of Market Economic Status of China], 34 J.
SHANXI NORMAL U. [SOC. SCI. ED.] 4 (2007) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Feng & Yu]. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See China Profile, supra note 72; Australia Profile, supra note 62. 
 80. Feng & Yu, supra note 76. 
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A second factor to take into account is the relative levels of market 
development in both countries.  The high level of Australian market 
development renders it impossible that the viability of most Chinese exports 
in Australia mainly depends on their technological capacity and the quality 
of their products, but not on competitive prices, which are readily caught by 
anti-dumping measures.  On the other hand, Australian exports obtain a 
comparative advantage that is exclusively focused on mining products and 
natural resources.81  Consequently, Australian exporters are not forced to 
compete in the Chinese market by means of reducing export prices as these 
products are essential for Chinese economic development and are not easy 
to obtain from other foreign exporters.  One such example is BHP, 
Australia’s domestic giant for iron ore, which has continuously raised rather 
than lowered its prices of products into the Chinese market over the past 
years.82  In addition to the above, the feasibility study indicates that the 
service industry is another area for Australia that has played an important 
role in its economy and thus gained a comparative advantage, compared 
with China.83  Despite this, generally, anti-dumping measures are unable to 
be applied to services, but only to goods.84  Furthermore, it is mostly 
impossible for Australian service exporters to retain their services market 
presence in China by means of low-prices.  This is because China has a 
large population and thus the labour cost in its services market is relatively 
low.  On the other hand, if Australian service exporters attempt to match 
low-prices in China, they also take a risk in violating other rules even 
though service transactions are not subject to current anti-dumping laws.85
Consequently, this fact may also partly contribute to the concern over the 
asymmetry in initiations of anti-dumping investigations mutually brought 
by the two countries. 
In addition to anti-dumping measures, according to the feasibility study 
and other relevant statistics, no anti-subsidy investigations have been 
initiated by China against Australian exports.86  Moreover, there has been 
only one safeguard case in China since its accession to the WTO.87  As a 
 81. Australia Profile, supra note 62. 
 82. BHP Doubles Price of Ore for Bao Steel, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jul. 4, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/04/business/worldbusiness/04iht-
04bhp.14235821.html?_r=1. 
 83. See FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 2, at 43 (stating that the feasibility study 
indicates that Australia’s service sector is compromised 80% of GDP in 2003 and China was 
its eighth-largest service export market in 2003, while China’s service sector only contributes 
31.8% to GDP). 
 84. According to GATT 1947 Article VI and 1994 WTO ADA, which laid out 
fundamental rules for anti-dumping investigations; anti-dumping measures are only applied 
to “products.”  GATT, supra note 10, art. VI; 1994 ADA, supra note 15. 
 85. For example, anti-monopoly laws or anti-competition rules may apply under 
certain circumstances.  
 86. FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 2. 
 87. Heng, supra note 55. 
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new member in the WTO, the history of use with regard to trade remedies is 
of recent origin for China even though it has tended to employ more 
measures during recent years to balance its trade relationships with other 
partners.  Compared with numerous anti-dumping measures, there are 
relatively fewer countervailing measures and safeguard measures employed 
by WTO members worldwide.88  As a result, it is not surprising that China, 
as a new member of the WTO, has an incentive to prevent anti-subsidy and 
safeguard investigations from being initiated.  
In contrast, as indicated above,89 Australia’s latest tendency to subject 
single Chinese products to both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
investigations should generate anxiety as to its uncertainty regarding 
possible future tactics to target Chinese exports by employing trade remedy 
measures.  This may further suggest that countervailing measures and 
safeguard measures will be the new potential challenges posed by Australia 
to China’s exports in the coming years.  
In conclusion, compared with their trading partners who are dominant 
users of trade remedy measures, both Australia and China do curb the 
frequent application of such measures posed mutually.  Obviously, this is 
the outcome of comparative advantages and economic status in both 
countries that are mutually complementary, which further lays the 
groundwork for the ongoing bilateral FTA negotiation. 
III. TRADE REMEDIES UNDER THE FUTURE SINO-AUSTRALIA FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT
A. Trade Remedies Under China’s Existing Free Trade Agreements 
As of February 2009,  China has reached several bilateral free trade 
agreements with its various trading partners amongst WTO members, 
including Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, ASEAN, Hong Kong, 
and Macao.  Provisions in regard to trade remedy measures have been 
incorporated into all these FTAs. 
Generally, bilateral FTAs that China has established with these partners 
cover three basic types: FTAs that China signed with Hong Kong and 
Macao; FTAs with Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore; and the 
FTA with ASEAN. 
 88. Relevant conclusion can be drawn from the WTO Statistics on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.  WTO, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Gateway, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/scm_e.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2009); WTO, 
Trade Topics, Safeguards Gateway http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/safeg_e/safeg_e.htm 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2009). 
 89. See supra notes 46 & 47. 
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FTAs that China reached with Hong Kong and Macao, which are both 
titled “Closer Economic Partnership Agreement” (“CEPA”),90 are not free 
trade agreements negotiated between countries per se.  Since 1997, Hong 
Kong and Macao have reverted to Mainland China.  Over the past centuries, 
these two territories have been designed and developed as important free 
trade areas in Southeast Asia.  Furthermore, the fact that Hong Kong and 
Macao are GATT/WTO members also contributes to the engagement of 
CEPAs.91  Consequently, the engagement of these CEPAs, in the context of 
their extraordinary background of history and political reality, plays a 
paramount role not only in trade and economic partnerships, but more 
importantly, in the political arena.  This approach, which highlights the “one 
country, two systems” policy,92 implies that these CEPAs are more likely to 
be preferential arrangements granted between two areas in one single 
country: Mainland China and Hong Kong, Mainland China and Macao, 
respectively.  Apparently, such arrangements engender much closer 
partnerships amongst negotiating parties than do FTAs engaged in between 
independent countries.  
Provisions regarding anti-dumping measures and countervailing 
measures in the two CEPAs provide that the two sides undertake that 
neither will apply anti-dumping measures and countervailing measures to 
goods imported and originated from the other.93  On the other hand, 
although the CEPAs do not clearly identify bilateral safeguards and global 
safeguards throughout the texts, relevant provisions in CEPAs do imply that 
the term “safeguards” in the context should be interpreted to mean bilateral 
safeguards.94 In light of this, the two sides undertake that: 
[I]f the implementation of the ‘CEPA’ causes sharp increase in the import . 
. . [from the other side which has caused or threatened to cause serious 
injury to the affected side’s domestic industry] . . . the affected side may, 
after giving written notice, temporarily suspend the concessions on the 
 90. Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, P.R.C.-
H.K., June 29, 2003, available at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/legaltext 
/cepa_legaltext.html [hereinafter Hong Kong CEPA]; Mainland and Macao Closer Economic 
Partnership Agreement, Oct. 17, 2003, available at http://www.economia.gov.mo 
/web/DSE/public?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=Pg_EETR_CEPA_T&locale=zh_MO 
[hereinafter Macao CEPA]. 
 91. Prior to Mainland China’s accession to the WTO in December 2000, both Hong 
Kong, China, and Macao, China have been WTO members since January 1, 1995.  
 92. “One country, two systems” is an idea provided by the then Chinese Communist 
Party leader Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, which proposed that within one China, areas such 
as Hong Kong and Macao can retain their capitalist economic and political systems, while 
Mainland China uses the socialist system. 
 93. Hong Kong CEPA, supra note 90, arts. 7–8; Macao CEPA, supra note 90, arts. 
7–8. 
 94. Hong Kong CEPA, supra note 90, art. 9; Macao CEPA, supra note 90, art. 9. 
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import . . . and shall, . . .  [promptly commence consultation] . . . in order 
to reach an agreement.95
These provisions regarding bilateral safeguards in CEPAs, if compared with 
similar ones in most FTAs, are relatively simple as they lack any detailed 
procedural and substantive rules.  For example, they do not identify the 
transition period and fail to specify how the findings concerning “sharp 
increase” and “serious injury” are reached.  Nonetheless, upon superficial 
analysis, this simple method does indicate that the two sides are anxious to 
employ consultation rather than trade remedies when disputes arise.  
Despite this, it is unclear whether this was done in response to the 
successful implementation of the “one country, two systems” policy. 
As indicated above, China’s FTAs with Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, 
and Singapore cover another type of trade remedy provisions.  Some 
observations relating to these provisions should be noted.  Firstly, all FTAs 
in this type maintain parties’ rights to take anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures.  There are some minor differences regarding these measures 
amongst agreements that China has engaged in.  Provisions concerning anti-
dumping and countervailing measures in FTAs between China and other 
developing countries, such as Pakistan and Chile, are identical, asserting 
that anti-dumping and countervailing measures taken shall be subject to 
relevant rules under the WTO.96  In addition, they lack further regulations in 
texts.  In contrast, anti-dumping and countervailing provisions in FTAs that 
China signed with developed countries, for example, New Zealand and 
Singapore are more precise and strict.  According to those provisions, any 
action taken by parties should be carried out in a transparent manner rather 
than an arbitrary or protectionist manner; the party that has accepted an 
application from a domestic industry calling on anti-dumping investigations 
shall notify the other party as soon as possible; neither party shall introduce 
or maintain any form of export subsidy on any goods exported to the other 
party.97  Moreover, detailed provisions are specifically incorporated into the 
text in order to express concern over the issue of cooperation and 
consultation when employing trade remedies.98  Although New Zealand is 
 95. Hong Kong CEPA, supra note 90, art. 9; Macao CEPA, supra note 90, art. 9.
 96. See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, P.R.C.-Pak., art. 25, Nov. 
24, 2006, [hereinafter FTA P.R.C.-Pak.]; Free Trade Agreement Between The Government 
of The People’s Republic of China and The Government of The Republic of Chile, P.R.C.-
Chile, art. 52, Oct. 1, 2006 [hereinafter FTA P.R.C.-Chile]. 
 97. Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China and the Government of New Zealand, P.R.C.-N.Z., arts. 61–63, Apr. 7, 2008, 
[hereinafter FTA P.R.C.-N.Z.]; Free Trade Agreement Between The Government of The 
People’s Republic of China and The Government of Singapore, P.R.C.-Sing., arts. 38, 40–41, 
Oct. 23, 2008 [hereinafter FTA P.R.C.-Sing.]. 
 98. FTA P.R.C.-N.Z., supra note 97, art. 65; FTA P.R.C.-Sing., supra note 97, art. 
39. 
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China’s one trading partner which has undertaken relatively fewer anti-
dumping and countervailing measures against Chinese exports amongst all 
developed countries,99 it continues to play a dominant role in taking such 
measures when compared with China’s trading partners amongst developing 
countries, such as Pakistan and Chile.100  Following this trend, in a very 
similar vein, these trade remedy provisions were also incorporated into the 
text of the China-Singapore FTA in September 2008,101 which suggests a 
laudable model for China to address similar issues of trade remedies in 
respect of other developed countries.  
In this type of FTAs, all provisions regarding global safeguards are 
identical, i.e., parties maintain their rights and obligations under Article 
XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards.102  More detailed 
regulations are developed for bilateral safeguards, which form the most 
comprehensive section in FTAs’ texts concerning trade remedies.  The 
contents of these provisions are fairly similar, including the definition, the 
transition period, conditions and limitations, provisional measures, 
procedures and compensation.103  They have been designed to protect 
domestic industries, during the transition period, from the increasingly 
severe challenges due to the engagement of the FTA.  In addition to the 
above, in FTAs that China signed with Chile and New Zealand, several 
provisions have been incorporated that tenuously cover trade remedies with 
regard to agricultural goods.104  Both Chile and New Zealand are major 
export-oriented countries in respect of agricultural goods in the Southern 
Hemisphere.105  According to the China-Chile FTA, both parties are obliged 
not to introduce or maintain any export subsidy on any agricultural goods 
destined for the other party.106  It also encourages the two parties to 
 99. Relevant conclusion can be drawn from the WTO anti-dumping statistics 
provided by WTO members.  See WTO, Anti-Dumping, Gateway, 2001–2008, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm. Obviously, New Zealand had fewer 
anti-dumping and countervailing investigations against China during the past years, 
compared with other developed countries such as the European Union, the United States, 
Canada, and Australia, according to these statistics from the WTO.  However, if compared 
with some developing countries, for example, Pakistan and Chile, the figures are still higher. 
 100. Id. 
 101. FTA P.R.C.-Sing., supra note 97, arts. 37–43. 
 102. See FTA P.R.C.-Pak., supra note 96, art 26; FTA P.R.C.-Chile, supra note 96, 
art. 51; FTA P.R.C.-N.Z., supra note 97, art. 64; FTA P.R.C.-Sing., supra note 97, art. 42. 
 103. See FTA P.R.C.-Pak., supra note 96, art. 27; FTA P.R.C.-Chile, supra note 96, 
arts. 45–50; FTA P.R.C.-N.Z., supra note 97, arts. 66–72; FTA P.R.C.-Sing., supra note 97, 
art. 43. 
 104. See FTA P.R.C.-N.Z., supra note 97, arts. 10, 13 (protecting agricultural 
industries through the regulation of agricultural export subsidies and special agricultural 
safeguard measures); see also FTA P.R.C.-Chile, supra note 96, art. 12 (regulating 
agricultural export subsidies). 
 105. Australia Profile, supra note 62; China Profile, supra note 72. 
 106. FTA P.RC.-N.Z., supra note 97, art. 10(3); FTA P.R.C.-Chile, supra note 96, art. 
12(2). 
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cooperate on discussions in WTO forums regarding export subsidies for 
agricultural goods.107  In the China-New Zealand FTA, in addition to the 
similar provision concerning the elimination of export subsidies for 
agricultural goods, a special article has been incorporated empowering 
China to undertake special safeguards against agricultural goods from New 
Zealand. 108 In fact, New Zealand government eliminated all subsidies for its 
farmers in 1984.109  As a result, Chinese agricultural industry is the only de
facto party affected by the provision relating to the elimination of export 
subsidies for agricultural goods due to the FTA.  Thus, undertaking special 
safeguard measures, in this context, can be essentially a powerful weapon 
used by China to fight market competition introduced by agricultural goods 
from New Zealand.  Simultaneously, it further reduces the degree of 
protectionist pressure from China’s conservative domestic industries in 
agriculture when they are faced with increasing competition from overseas. 
The third type of trade remedies is incorporated in the China-ASEAN 
FTA.  Based upon the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Co-operation between ASEAN and China,110 China signed the Agreement 
on Trade in Goods with ASEAN in November 2004.111  The Agreement sets 
out several factors when mutually undertaking trade remedies.  Firstly, no 
provisions regarding anti-dumping and countervailing measures are 
specified in the Agreement.  Despite this, Article 7 of the Agreement titled 
“WTO Disciplines” outlines that “the Parties . . . [agree and reaffirm their 
commitments to abide by the provisions of the WTO disciplines on, among 
others,] . . . subsidies and countervailing measures, [anti-dumping 
measures] . . . .”112  Secondly, ASEAN acknowledges China as a full market 
economy and shall not apply Sections 15 and 16 of the Protocol of 
Accession of the PRC to the WTO and Paragraph 242 of the Report of the 
Working Party on the Accession of China to the WTO when dealing with 
the trade relationship between China and ASEAN.113  It should also be noted 
 107. FTA P.R.C.-N.Z., supra note 97, art. 10(2); FTA P.R.C.-Chile, supra note 96, 
art. 12(1).  
 108. FTA P.R.C.-N.Z., supra note 97, art. 13.  
 109. Laura Sayre, Farming Without Subsidies?, NEW FARM, Mar. 20, 2003, 
http://newfarm.rodaleinstitute.org/features/0303/newzealand_subsidies.shtml. 
 110. Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between 
ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China, Nov. 5, 2002, 
http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm. 
 111. Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Co-operation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the 
People’s Republic of China, Nov. 29, 2004, http://www.aseansec.org/16646.htm [hereinafter 
Agreement on Trade in Goods]. 
 112. Id. art. 7. 
 113. Id. art. 14.  Article 15 of the Protocol of Accession of the PRC to the WTO, 
entitled “Price Comparability in Determining Subsidies and Dumping” states that WTO 
member can treat China as a non-market economy for fifteen years after its accession to the 
WTO for dumping purposes, and also provides that the SCM Agreement shall apply in 
proceedings involving imports of Chinese origin into a WTO Member and in countervailing 
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that there have been special regulations to address safeguards in the 
Agreement.  Article 9 of the Agreement specifically defines safeguard 
measures.114  Among them, Article 9(1) deals with global safeguards, while 
Article 9(2)–(11) regulate bilateral safeguards.  These provisions regarding 
bilateral safeguards are fairly similar to regulations in respect of bilateral 
safeguards that have been incorporated into the FTAs China negotiated with 
other trading partners, including conditions, the transition period, 
compensation and procedures.  One particular provision Article 9(7) 
appears curious as it empowers the importing party not to apply safeguard 
measures to a party if the latter’s market share of imports of the product 
concerned does not exceed 3% of the total imports from exporting parties.  
Such a regulation is more likely to be designed for ASEAN members who 
are small players in international trade, assuring that small players are also 
eligible to enjoy adequate interests in a multilateral free trade agreement. It 
may be impossible to incorporate this regulation, in this sense, into the text 
of a single bilateral free trade agreement.  As a result, the China-ASEAN 
FTA is essentially a plurilateral FTA rather than a merely bilateral one. 
B. Trade Remedies Under Australia’s Existing Free Trade 
Agreements 
As of the end of February 2009, Australia has entered into five FTAs 
with its trading partners, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, the United 
States, Chile, and ASEAN. Trade remedies provisions in these enacted 
agreements vary.  
ANZCERTA entered into force on January 1, 1983.115  According to 
Article 15 of the Agreement, both Australia and New Zealand may maintain 
duty actions against goods from China, benchmarks taken from outside China may under 
appropriate circumstances be used to identify and measure subsidy benefits.  Ministerial 
Conference, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Annex 2, art. 15, 
WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001), available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups
/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002123.pdf.  Article 16 of the Protocol of Accession of 
the PRC to the WTO, entitled “Transitional Product – Specific Safeguard 
Mechanism” describes that specific safeguard mechanism can be undertaken by WTO 
member countries to impose trade restrictions on imported Chinese products that cause or 
threaten to cause market disruption to domestic producers of similar or directly competitive 
products.  Ministerial Conference, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of 
China, Annex 2, art. 16, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001), available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN002123.pdf. 
Paragraph 242 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China to the WTO 
allows WTO members to apply textile-specific safeguard measures to Chinese textiles and 
clothing products until December 31, 2008 after its accession to the WTO. Working Party on 
the Accession of China, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, ¶ 242, 
WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001). 
 114. Agreement on Trade in Goods, supra note 111, art. 9. 
 115. Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, Austl.-
N.Z., art. 26, Mar. 28, 1983, 1983 Austl. T.S. No. 2 [hereinafter ANZCERTA]. 
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anti-dumping actions against goods originating from the other party.116
However, it was amended via the Protocol to the Australia New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations-Trade Agreement on Acceleration of Free Trade 
in Goods (“the Protocol”) which was enacted on August 18, 1988.117
Article 4 of this Protocol required the two parties to abolish anti-dumping 
actions after July 1990 when free trade was achieved.118  Consequently, only 
competition laws in the two countries could be employed against misuse of 
market power in trans-Tasman markets.119  In light of ANZCERTA, the two 
parties reserve their rights and obligations under the GATT and the 1979 
Subsidies Code in regard to countervailing measures undertaken.120
Moreover, countervailing measures can merely be undertaken “when no 
mutually acceptable alternative course of action has been determined [by] . . 
.” the two parties.121  Despite this, countervailing measures have never been 
undertaken between the two parties because both countries, through several 
official documents relating to the implementation of ANZCERTA122 and in 
practice, reaffirm that they would not introduce or maintain any form of 
export subsidy, export incentive or other assistance measure having similar 
trade distorting effects to export incentives on any goods destined for the 
other party.  Strikingly, there are no provisions regarding global safeguards 
in ANZCERTA.  However, bilateral safeguards that are eligible to be 
imposed only in the transition period have been regulated.123  This was done 
in the text by providing conditions and procedures for the implementation of 
bilateral safeguards as well as the definition of the transition period.124
However, the transition period was accomplished in 1988 (when the 
Protocol was signed), which has rendered the abovementioned provisions 
regarding bilateral safeguards invalid.  Currently, no bilateral safeguards 
can thus be undertaken between the two countries. 
The Singapore-Australia FTA (“SAFTA”) has been Australia’s first free 
trade agreement since the start of its closer economic relationship with New 
Zealand in 1983.  Unlike ANZCERTA, SAFTA empowers the two parties 
to reserve their rights to undertake anti-dumping measures against the other 
 116. Id. art. 15. 
 117. See Protocol to the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations, supra
note 24. 
 118. Id. art. 4. 
 119. Id. art. 4. 
 120. ANZCERTA, supra note 115, art. 16(1)(a).  As ANZCERTA was signed in 
1982, the international convention for countervailing measures was the 1979 Subsidies Code, 
not its current form 1994 SCM. 
 121. Id. art. 16(1)(c). 
 122. There are many other official documents, such as exchange letters between the 
two countries after the Agreement was signed.  See Australia Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, Closer Economic Relations, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new_zealand/anz_cer 
/anz_cer_trade.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2009). 
 123. ANZCERTA, supra note 115, art. 17. 
 124. Id. 
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party’s exports under Article VI of the GATT and the WTO 1994 ADA.125
Nevertheless, some challenging criteria have been incorporated into the 
agreement, which are apparently stricter than rules under the ADA.  This 
includes setting time frames for determining the volume of dumped imports 
in an investigation or review, a lesser duty rule and procedures for 
compulsory notification.126  The elimination of export subsidies is extended 
to all goods (even to agricultural products).127  Countervailing measures are 
committed to being subject to the WTO 1994 SCM if they are undertaken.128
One particular provision that should be noted is that the two parties agreed 
to abolish safeguard measures mutually initiated or undertaken.129
The Thailand-Australia FTA (“TAFTA”) entered into force on January 
1, 2005. Australia regards TAFTA as a “major market opening agreement,” 
which will grant all Australian exports no tariffs as of January 2010 when 
entering into Thailand’s market.130  Like SAFTA, both parties maintain their 
commitments regarding anti-dumping measures under Article VI of the 
GATT and the WTO ADA.131  Similarly, they also commit to some criteria 
which are stricter than rules under the existing WTO ADA.  For example, 
providing more detailed procedures for price undertakings and setting time 
frames for determining the volume of dumped imports in an investigation or 
review.132  Countervailing measures undertaken will also be subject to the 
WTO 1994 SCM and no export subsidy will be introduced or maintained on 
any agricultural good destined for the other party.133  In addition to this, 
more cooperation, consultation, and communication are required in regard 
to agricultural and food industries when relevant policies and measures 
imposed are being changed.134
The most significant section of TAFTA in regard to trade remedies is its 
safeguard measures, which contains a fairly comprehensive and detailed 
structure, covering all types of transitional safeguards (bilateral safeguards), 
global safeguards and special safeguards.  Both parties will maintain their 
commitments regarding global safeguards under Article XIX of the GATT 
and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.135  However, each party is 
 125. SAFTA, supra note 51, art. 8.1.  
 126. Id. art. 8.2. 
 127. Id. art. 7.1. 
 128. Id. art. 7.2. 
 129. Id. art. 9. 
 130. See Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Thailand-Australia Free 
Trade Agreement (TAFTA): Guide to the Provisions of the Thailand-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/aust-thai/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2009). 
 131. Agreement on Bilateral Cooperation Between the Government of Australia and 
the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand, Thail.-Austl., art. 206(1), July 5, 2004, 2004 
Austl. T.S. No. 18 [hereinafter TAFTA]. 
 132. Id. art. 206(2).  
 133. Id. arts. 207, 208(2). 
 134. Id. art. 208(3). 
 135. Id. art. 508(1). 
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empowered to exclude the other party’s exports from its proposed safeguard 
action if such imports do not cause serious injury, or threat thereof, or 
serious damage, or actual threat thereof, or any other factors that are 
consistent with relevant rules under the WTO.136  In this method, 
consultation is also required when the aforementioned action is 
undertaken.137
In light of TAFTA, transitional safeguards may apply when the other 
party’s increased imports resulting from the reduction or elimination of a 
customs duty pursuant to TAFTA cause or threaten serious damage to 
domestic industries which produce like or directly competitive product.138
Consequently, parties, under certain strictly defined conditions, may lift the 
tariff to the MFN rate which applied either at entry into force of TAFTA, or 
at the time the measure is imposed (whichever is lower).139  Transitional 
safeguards may be imposed initially for two years, and can be extended to a 
maximum of six years.140  In addition to the above, more detailed 
procedures in regard to undertaking such measures are also identified, 
including investigation, provisional measures, notification, consultation, and 
compensation.141
Special safeguards, in the context of TAFTA, are only designed for 
agricultural products that both parties consider sensitive.  Annex 5 of 
TAFTA contains a list of such products, adding a period that special 
safeguards can be applied to each product.  As a result, if the volume of 
imports regarding that sensitive product entering the party during any given 
calendar year exceeds the specified volume trigger level for that year 
identified in Annex 5, the other party may increase the rate of customs duty 
applicable to the product for the remainder of that calendar year through the 
application of the customs duty for such product at the current MFN rate or 
the base rate (whichever is lower).142  Relevant procedural rules also include 
consultation, cooperation and review of the operation system.143   
The Australia-Chile FTA is the latest free trade agreement Australia has 
implemented.  It was concluded in May 2008, signed on July 30, 2008 and 
entered into force on January 1, 2009.144  Chapter 8 of the Agreement 
addresses the issue of trade remedies.  Both parties agreed to maintain their 
commitments under Article VI of the GATT 1994, the WTO Agreement 
 136. Id. 
 137. TAFTA, supra note 131, art. 508(2).  
 138. Id. art. 502. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. art. 503(1). 
 141. Id. arts. 504–06. 
 142. Id. arts. 509(4), 509(5). 
 143. TAFTA, supra note 131, arts. 509(7), 509(8), 509(10). 
 144. Australia–Chile Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-Chile, July 30, 2008, 2009 Austl. 
T.S. No. 6. 
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ADA and their successors.145  No export subsidy will be introduced or 
maintained in regard to any agricultural products destined for the other 
party.146  Global safeguards will be subject to Article XIX of the GATT 
1994, the Agreement on Safeguards, other relevant provisions in the WTO 
Agreement, and their successors.147  It is surprising that neither transitional 
safeguards nor special safeguards have been identified in this FTA.  
The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (“AUSFTA”) is “one 
of the most important bilateral economic and commercial agreements ever 
negotiated by” Australia,148 and was approved in 2004.  As with most 
provisions regarding anti-dumping and countervailing measures in FTAs, 
AUSFTA announced that both parties will retain their WTO rights to anti-
dumping and countervailing actions and neither party will make any change 
to their current relevant domestic legislation.149  Chapter 9 of AUSFTA 
employs transitional bilateral safeguards and global safeguards as 
mechanisms for protecting domestic industries from any injurious effect 
brought about by the reduction or elimination of the prevailing tariffs.150
Detailed provisions in regard to transitional bilateral safeguards have been 
incorporated in the Agreement, including the imposition of a safeguard 
measure, conditions and limitations, provisional safeguard measures and 
compensation.151  If AUSFTA leads to increased quantities of imports and 
causes substantial cases of serious injury or threat to domestic industries, 
the affected party can suspend the further reduction of any rate of custom 
duty; or increase the rate of custom duty to a level not to exceed the lesser 
of: (a) the MFN applied rate of duty on the import in effect at the time the 
action is taken; and (b) the MFN applied rate of duty in effect on the day 
immediately preceding the date of entry into force of the FTA.152  Moreover, 
export subsidies on agricultural goods destined for each other’s markets are 
prohibited.153  However, there is a slight difference for both parties in regard 
to undertaking agricultural safeguard measures.  The United States was 
permitted to apply safeguard measures on a limited range of agricultural 
goods under the Agreement.154
 145. Id. art. 8.2(1). 
 146. Id. art. 3.13(2). 
 147. Id. art. 8.2(1). 
 148. Australia Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ACCI Review No. 102, Australia 
United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 2003, at 7, http://acci.asn.au/text_files/ 
review/r102.pdf. 
 149. Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., art. 2.9(2), May 18, 
2004, 118 Stat. 919 [hereinafter Austl.-U.S. FTA]. 
 150. Id. arts. 9.1, 9.5. 
 151. Id. arts. 9.2–9.4. 
 152. Id. art. 9.1. 
 153. Id. art. 3.3(1). 
 154. Id. art. 3.4. 
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According to AUSFTA, global safeguards are taken under the WTO.155
Notwithstanding no amended commitments to the WTO Agreement on 
Safeguards, a new term “substantial cause” has been employed in the text as 
follows: “a [p]arty taking a global safeguard measure may exclude imports 
of an originating good from the other [p]arty if such imports are not a 
substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof.”156  In addition, special 
safeguards on textiles are also addressed in the Agreement.157
The Agreement Establishing The ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free 
Trade Area (“AANZFTA”) is the latest free trade agreement that Australia 
has signed.  It was signed on February 29, 2009 and will enter into force no 
later than January 1, 2010.158  The Agreement does not explicitly employ 
any clause to regulate anti-dumping and countervailing measures, which is 
different from other FTAs Australia has implemented.  Within the entire 
text of the Agreement, on only one occasion it implies that anti-dumping 
and countervailing measures can be applied under the WTO.159  In addition, 
each party agrees to “eliminate and not reintroduce all forms of export 
subsidies for agricultural goods.”160  The Agreement merely regulates global 
safeguards and transitional safeguards.  Each Party retains its rights and 
obligations to undertake global safeguards against other parties.161
However, the Agreement does not empower the party to exclude other 
parties’ exports from its proposed global safeguard action as some FTAs 
regulate.162  It only requires the party to “initiate consultations with that 
[p]arty or [p]arties as far in advance of taking such measure as 
 155.  Austl.-U.S. FTA, supra note 149, art. 9.5. 
 156. Id. (emphasis added). 
 157. Id. art. 4.1(8). 
 158. Agreement Establishing the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area, 
ch. 18, art. 7, Feb. 27, 2009, available at http://www.aseansec.org/22260.pdf. [hereinafter 
AANZFTA].  Although Article 7, Chapter 18 of the Agreement stated that the “[a]greement 
shall enter into force on 1 July 2009 for any Party that has made such notifications provided 
that Australia, New Zealand and at least four ASEAN Member States have made such 
notifications by that date” or “[i]f this Agreement does not enter into force on 1 July 2009 it 
shall enter into force, for any Party that has made the notification referred to in Paragraph 1, 
60 days after the date by which Australia, New Zealand and at least four ASEAN Member 
States have made the notifications,” it has not entered into force yet on July 8, 2009.  Id.
However, according to the overview of this Agreement which is provided by Australian 
government, the Agreement will enter into force no later than January 1, 2010.  Id.   
 159. Id. ch. 1, art. 3.  Article 3 “General Definitions” mentions the definition “customs 
duties” in this Agreement, which are supposed to reduced in light of the negotiation should 
exclude “anti-dumping or countervailing duty applied consistently with the provisions of 
Article VI of GATT 1994, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, as may be amended and the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement, as may be amended.”  
Id.
 160. Id. ch. 2, art. 3. 
 161. Id.
 162. Id.
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practicable.”163  The transitional period for transitional safeguards is “the 
period from entry into force of the Agreement until three years after the 
customs duty on that good is eliminated or reduced to its final commitment, 
in accordance with a [p]arty’s schedule of tariff commitments.”164  The 
duration of a transitional safeguard measure that a party may maintain is 
two years and can be extended for another year.165  Repeat application of a 
safeguard measure is also prohibited within the specific years.166  Strikingly, 
the Agreement regulates the minimum thresholds, which was settled as “its 
share of imports of the good concerned in the importing [p]arty does not 
exceed three per cent of the total imports from the other Parties, provided 
that those [p]arties with less than three per cent import share collectively 
account for not more than nine per cent of total imports of the good 
concerned from the other Parties,”167 for the application of safeguard 
measures to imports from ASEAN parties.  Expect all above mentioned, like 
all other FTAs, the Agreement specifically details the procedures and 
conditions regarding the application of transitional safeguards, including 
imposition of a safeguard measure, notification, provisional measures, 
investigation, and compensation.168  These provisions are fairly similar to 
other FTAs that Australia signed previously regarding transitional 
safeguards. 
C. Trade Remedies Under the Future SINO-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement
Nearly four years have elapsed since Australia and China initiated the 
FTA negotiation in 2005.  Notwithstanding the joint feasibility study and 
thirteen negotiating rounds which have been concluded, current talks have 
hit deadlock.169  The painfully slow progress of the negotiation has 
demonstrated the great diversity between the two parties in regard to some 
key issues, such as government procurement, agricultural products and 
intellectual property rights, which renders it difficult for one party to 
accommodate the other’s requests, and thus reach an agreement.  Despite 
discussions regarding trade remedies in several rounds of the negotiation, so 
 163. AANZFTA, supra note 116, ch. 7, art. 9(3). 
 164. Id. ch. 7, art. 2(g). 
 165. Id. ch. 7, art. 6.1(b). 
 166. See id. ch. 7, art. 6(6).  “No safeguard measure shall be applied again to the 
import of a particular originating good which has been subject to such a safeguard measure, 
for a period of time equal to the duration of the previous safeguard measure, or two years, 
whichever is longer.”  Id.
 167. Id. ch. 7, art. 6(2). 
 168. See id. ch. 7, arts. 3–5, 7–8. 
 169. See also Yang Jiang, Australia-China FTA: China’s Domestic Politics and the 
Roots of Different National Approaches to FTAs, 62 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 179 (2008) 
(explaining why the Free Trade Agreement negotiation between Australia and China has 
been extremely difficult). 
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far there have been no more relevant documents released to indicate 
whether any final resolution of this particular issue has been reached. 
In the proposed Sino-Australia agreement, the approach embedded in the 
China-New Zealand FTA in respect of trade remedies can be adopted to 
address the issue of trade remedy measures between China and Australia.  
Equipped with all well-known types of measures (including anti-dumping 
measures, countervailing measures, bilateral safeguards, global safeguards, 
and special safeguards) domestic industries will have a robust system to 
provide adequate protection that might be undermined due to the FTA, and 
thereby minimize injuries brought to the national welfare.  This China-New 
Zealand approach can be employed not only because economies of New 
Zealand and Australia share some similarities, but more because Sino-
Australia relations, especially economic relations, are fairly similar to Sino-
New Zealand relations.  Amongst China’s trading partners, New Zealand 
and Australia are the only two developed countries that have acknowledged 
China’s full market economy status.  Moreover, compared with other 
frequent users of trade remedies against Chinese exports (notably the United 
States and the EU), these countries’ attitude is not over-vigilant.  This 
comparatively relaxed attitude has been fully illustrated by the fact that 
relatively few investigations have been initiated in regard to Chinese 
exports in both countries.  Despite this, however, it should also be noted that 
Australia’s economic size is much larger than New Zealand’s and its major 
domestic industries are often highly developed.  As a result, once a Sino-
Australia FTA is concluded, it is more likely that the FTA will have a 
greater impact on Australian domestic industries than it has on New 
Zealand’s.  This further highlights the significance of the enactment of a 
better balanced system in the Sino-Australia FTA for trade remedies.  
Suggestions on how such a system can be developed for the future ACFTA 
will be canvassed in the following section of this paper. 
Firstly, it is apparently not possible for both parties to follow the 
approach adopted by ANZCERTA, i.e., employing domestic competition 
laws to substitute anti-dumping and countervailing provisions in the FTA, to 
address the issue of anti-dumping and countervailing.  Due to China’s 
increasing capacity in manufacturing and export and thereby the pressure 
brought to bear by Australian domestic industries, anti-dumping measures 
will continue to be one of the most powerful weapons against Chinese 
exports.  Meanwhile, another concern should also generate anxiety as to 
whether Australian domestic industries will initiate more anti-subsidy 
investigations in regard to Chinese products after Australia’s official 
acknowledgement of China’s full market economy status.  A further 
concern is Australian domestic industries’ latest tendency, following the 
practices of the United States and Canada, to subject one single Chinese 
2010] Trade Remedies 295
product to both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations.170  Article VI 
(5) of the GATT 1947 reads: “no product of the territory of any contracting 
party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be 
subject to both anti-dumping and countervailing duties to compensate for 
the same situation of dumping or export subsidization.”171  However, the 
GATT/WTO framework does not provide a detailed interpretation 
concerning this provision as to whether both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
investigations can be initiated simultaneously against one single product, 
which leaves diverse understandings amongst WTO members in practice.  
Due to a lack of consensus on this issue, it is always easy to garner severe 
criticisms from others when one member’s domestic industries attempt to 
initiate such investigations.  Consequently, as this latest development in 
Australia was heavily criticized by the Chinese government,172 it also raises 
the question for the FTA as to whether and how a joint committee should be 
set up to resolve disputes arising out of trade remedies.  In addition to this, 
the proposed FTA should prohibit any form of export subsidy on any goods 
from one party destined for the other party. 
Secondly, special safeguards should be incorporated into the FTA 
regarding sensitive sectors for both parties.  Each country may identify 
some industrial sectors as sensitive.  This will leave the two governments 
engaging in the negotiation sufficient leeway when facing domestic 
protectionists, which will also facilitate the later rounds of the negotiation.  
For example, to put some agricultural products and certain textile products 
on the list of sensitive sectors will not only relieve the pressure from 
domestic industries of both parties respectively, it will also, to some degree, 
work to heal the divisions that held back the progress of the negotiation. 
Thirdly, both parties should agree to adopt bilateral safeguards during the 
transition period.  The transition period can be extended for certain sensitive 
industries and products.  This will give both parties’ domestic industries 
sufficient opportunities to adjust their industrial structures, and it will also 
reduce the potential risk that certain exports will challenge to domestic 
industries in their infant stage of development. 
Finally, global safeguards should be subject to the WTO Agreement on 
Safeguards.  However, certain preferential arrangements may be granted; 
for example, excluding the other party from the proposed safeguard 
 170. Recently, the United States has been quite anxious to subject one single Chinese 
product to both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations.  Zhang Ning, China: US 
Abusing Anti-Dumping Rules, CCTV NEWS, July 1, 2009, 
http://www.cctv.com/program/cctvnews/20090701/101765.shtml.  For example, between the 
end of June 2009 and early July 2009, within only ten days, the United States has initiated 
three investigations against Chinese products.  Id. See supra notes 46 & 47 (providing the 
Australian practices). 
 171. See GATT, supra note 10, art. VI(5). 
 172. Xinhua News Agency, supra note 48. 
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measure, if suspected products originating in the territory of the other party 
do not cause serious injuries to domestic industries. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Trade remedy measures, as a safety valve for free trade, have played an 
increasingly important role in FTAs.  An efficient and effective system of 
trade remedy measures can assist domestic industries as a powerful weapon 
in fighting the sharp pain that FTAs temporarily bring, and thereby protect 
the importing market to a certain degree.  Moreover, a sound system can 
also become an escape valve when the government faces with the 
impairment of national welfare that protectionists claim.  Therefore, the 
enactment of trade remedy measures in FTAs may relieve political 
pressures that are imposed on negotiating parties to some degree during 
negotiations and thus facilitate agreements.  In this regard, the successful 
regulation and implementation of trade remedy measures in the forthcoming 
ACFTA is paramount.  This will not only bring more fruitful outcomes to 
the ongoing negotiation, a better agreement of the ACFTA, as well as a 
successful free trade area; it will also have a far-reaching impact on the 
future trade relationship between Australia and China. 
